Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind

9781680833225

Long-time PAICSer and COGS person, Rob Clowes, has just published an impressive monograph, along with Paul Smart and Richard Heersmink, entitled Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind.  From the email I received from the publisher today:

I am pleased to announce that Foundations and Trends in Web Science (www.nowpublishers.com/web) has published the following issue:

Volume 6, Issue 1-2
Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind
By Paul Smart (University of Southampton, UK), Robert Clowes (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal) and

Richard Heersmink (Macquarie University, Australia)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000026

Complimentary downloads of this article will be available until September 29th, so you should be able to access it directly using the link provided.

Here is the abstract:

Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent-world interactions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

Minds Online: The Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind heeds the call of the early Web Science pioneers by expanding the interdisciplinary scope of Web Science, specifically, to accommodate the disciplines of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. There is a substantial literature to support this expansionist agenda. Given the centrality of cognition to our species-specific capabilities, as well as the level of public and scientific interest in the Web, now is arguably an appropriate time to review this literature and explicate the nature of the linkages that connect the science of the Web with the sciences of the mind.

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The Embodied Nature of Computation

human-body-as-a-computer

 

The next E-Intentionality seminar will be held Wednesday, June 8th from 13:00 to 14:50 in Pevensey 1 1A3.  Ron Chrisley will speak on “The Embodied Nature of Computation” as a dry run of his talk at a symposium (“Embodied Cognition: Constructivist and Computationalist Perspectives”) at IACAP 2016 next week:

 

Although embodiment-based critiques of computation’s role in explaining mind have at times been overstated, there are important lessons from embodiment which computationalists would do well to learn. For example, orthodox schemes for individuating computations are individualist, atemporal, and anti-semantical (formal), but considering the role of the body in cognition suggests by analogy that — even to explain extant information processing systems unrelated to cognitive science and artificial intelligence contexts — computations should instead be characterised in terms that are world-involving, dynamical and intentional/meaningful. Further, the counterfactual-involving nature of computational state individuation implies that sameness of computation is not in general preserved when one substitutes a non-living computational component with a living, autonomous, free organism that merely intends to realise the same functional profile as component being replaced. Thus, contra computational orthodoxy, there is no sharp divide between the computational facts and what is usually thought of as the implementational facts, even for unambiguously computational systems. The implications of this point for some famous disputes concerning group minds, and strong AI, will be identified.

Image from digitalmediatheory.files.wordpress.com

The Mereological Constraint

 

voice-in-head

brainworldmagazine.com

E-Intentionality, February 26th 2016, Pevensey 2A11, 12:00-12:50

Ron Chrisley: The Mereological Constraint

I will discuss what I call the mereological constraint, which can be traced back at least as far as Putnam’s writings in the 1960s, and is the idea, roughly, that a mind cannot have another mind as a proper constituent.  I show that the implications (benefits?) of such a constraint, if true, would be far-ranging, allowing one to finesse the Chinese room and Chinese nation arguments against computationalism, reject certain notions of extended mind, reject most group minds, make a ruling on the modality of sensory substitution, etc.  But is the mereological conjecture true?  I will look at some possible arguments for the conjecture, including one that appeals to the fact that rationality must be grounded in the non-rational, and one that attempts to derive the constraint from a comparable one concerning the individuation of computational states.  I will also consider an objection to the conjecture, that argues that it would confer on us a priori knowledge of facts that are, intuitively, empirical.

Audio (28.5 mb, .mp3)