The next E-Intentionality meeting will be April 8th (not April 1st – April Fool!), in Fulton 112 from 12:00-12:50. The speaker will be Sam Freed, on the topic: “A role for introspection in developing Anthropic AI”. Abstract:
AI as a technology is distinct from cognitive science in terms of methodology and requirements. Human-like AI is distinct from idealised/rational AI. Anthropic AI is defined as the part of human-like AI that deals with pre-cultural intelligence. Subjectivity is discussed as an intuitive gateway to building such AI. Introspection is defended from Watson and Simon’s attacks, and shown to be in widespread and reliable use in all human cultures. This is tied back to pragmatic AI development.
Audio (.mp3, 11MB)
- April 01: No meeting (Easter break)
- April 08: Fulton 112 (Sam Freed)
- April 15: Pevensey 2A2 (Adrian Downey)
- April 29: Pevensey 2A2 (Simon Bowes TBC)
“Information contents” is intended to be a new ‘topic’ IN THE EMBCOG postings. The writing icon at the top right of PAICS has been clicked after opening the EmbCog category on the right (which gives past posts only). Ron, is this right? It’s the only way I can find to put a new title into EmCog itself. — David
[David, all you have to do to make a new EmbCog post is click on the writing icon and then after writing your post, remember to tick “EmbCog” under the “Categories and Tags” menu (and untick “Unclassified”) to the left of the edit screen. I have done this for you now, so this post now appears under EmbCog — Ron]
Many thanks, Ron. I’ll try both of those clicks next time. – David
Your paper on information theory for the Embodied Cognition reading group is excellent. What about putting it on Wiki Psychology?
E-Intentionality, 12:00-12:50, March 11th 2016, Arundel 1C (note change of room)
Steven Broadrick: Predictive processing mind models vs the binding problem
Predictive processing mind models (PPMM) can, according to advocates such as Jakob Hohwy, account for the binding of visual percepts in their set-up. However, these arguments suffer from their lack of taking into account the necessary flexibility the model would need to possess in order to incorporate all of the differing types and aspects of visual binding. In working towards a conception of PPMM which can avoid running into these difficulties, I anticipate a model which does not bind visual percepts but performs operations on an already-bound visual world. However, before defining the specifics of either the model or the nature of the operations, it is necessary to try and construct a solid argument as to exactly how the visual world might be bound without the need for internal brain mechanisms to perform the binding. This talk will take two approaches as to how that argument might be constructed. Firstly, a cognitive science-based approach which examines and critiques those positions in which binding has already taken place in order to ascertain whether it is a coherent line to take. In this instance, I will look at Anne Treisman’s attentional spotlight hypothesis, and highlight some of the issues and problems surrounding it. Secondly, there should be a philosophical approach in which the prospect of world-centred binding is given a convincing metaphysical grounding. To this end, I will examine Donald Hoffman’s interface theory of perception and question whether aspects of it can be reversed to suggest that, contrary to Hoffman’s position, there is something akin to an objective, bound reality. I conclude by noting that if one could combine a watertight cognitive science-based argument as to why visual binding did not depend on internal brain mechanisms with an equally fleshed-out metaphysics that pointed towards ‘the world taking care of itself’, then one would have a solid theoretical base for proceeding with a reworking of the PPMM model.
Audio (15 MB; discussion only)
Remaining E-Intentionality dates and venues for Spring Term 2016:
- Mar 25: No meeting (Easter break)
- April 01: Pevensey 2A11 (Simon Bowes TBC)
- April 15: Pevensey 2A2 (TBA)
- April 29: Pevensey 2A2 (TBA)
An Aristotelian Society talk next Monday in London looks to combine two issues that have separately been the focus of recent discussion here on the PAICS blog: mereology and representation.
…and by what mechanism were those contents generated?
Nicola Yuill (email@example.com) is coordinating a reading group on embodied cognition, currently meeting weekly to discuss Tony Chemero’s book Radical Embodied Cognitive Science.
Some people who could not get to the meetings have been circulating comments via the email list, but it was decided that the PAICS blog might be a better home for this discussion. To start things off, below please find a comment from Simon McGregor, David Booth’s reply, etc.