E-Intentionality, February 26th 2016, Pevensey 2A11, 12:00-12:50
Ron Chrisley: The Mereological Constraint
I will discuss what I call the mereological constraint, which can be traced back at least as far as Putnam’s writings in the 1960s, and is the idea, roughly, that a mind cannot have another mind as a proper constituent. I show that the implications (benefits?) of such a constraint, if true, would be far-ranging, allowing one to finesse the Chinese room and Chinese nation arguments against computationalism, reject certain notions of extended mind, reject most group minds, make a ruling on the modality of sensory substitution, etc. But is the mereological conjecture true? I will look at some possible arguments for the conjecture, including one that appeals to the fact that rationality must be grounded in the non-rational, and one that attempts to derive the constraint from a comparable one concerning the individuation of computational states. I will also consider an objection to the conjecture, that argues that it would confer on us a priori knowledge of facts that are, intuitively, empirical.
Audio (28.5 mb, .mp3)
The first EI of term (Feb 12th, 12:00-12:50, Pevensey 2A11) will be led by Jonny Lee:
Inference to Representation: Scientific Explanation & Two Kinds of Eliminativism
Representation features heavily in scientific explanations of cognition. The principle of ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE) says that we ought to believe that our best theories are true. If our best theories feature representations then, according to IBE, we ought to believe that those ascriptions are true. At the same time, eliminativism about mental representation remains popular. In its various forms, eliminativism holds that we ought to reject talk of representation in some or all of cognitive science. How do we reconcile the fundamental role of representation in cognitive science with the continued appeal of eliminativism? In beginning to answer this question, we must understand the different motivations belonging to distinctive kinds of eliminativism. There is more than one kind of eliminativism, and the conflation of these kinds leads to conceptual confusion. I will argue that there is an important distinction between a priori and a posteori eliminativism, and furthermore that a priori eliminativism faces serious obstacles in establishing itself as a persuasive challenger to the status quo. I will finish by considering the possibility that the ontology of mental representation could turn out to be more nuanced than philosophers have previously allowed for.
Audio (10mb, .mp3)