The Argument from Looks: A Plea for Representational Humility

Wed 9th Apr, 1:30-3:00

Keith Wilson: The Argument from Looks: A Plea for Representational Humility

The assumption that perceptual experience (seeing, hearing, and so on) is fundamentally representational is common in much recent philosophy and cognitive science. It is an assumption, however, that is rarely argued for or examined in detail. According to this assumption, perceptual experience (as distinct from judgement or belief) represents the world as being, or as seeming to be, some particular way. That is, each experience has a determinate set of truth conditions. In this paper, I present an argument, inspired by Travis (2004), that aims to challenge this orthodoxy, instead claiming that there is no single representational content of experience. Consequently, whilst the argument does not entirely rule out the existence of perceptual representations, it does highlight a fundamental tension in the way philosophers and scientists of perception have thought about such representation that severely constrains its explanatory role, raising a number of questions that have yet to be satisfactorily answered by proponents of the representational view.

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