What Happens When Reasoning Has Side Effects?

Wed 16 Apr, 1:30-3:00, Fulton 101

Simon McGregor: What Happens When Reasoning Has Side Effects?

The principle of embodiment in cognitive science emphasises that the main object of cognition is to reason about systems which the agent itself is part of and can affect through its actions. I propose that particular real-world circumstances can undermine the assumption that the process of reasoning does not affect the systems being reasoned about, and explore why this is a problem for typical conceptions of rationality. We will also discuss how Sorensen’s concept of epistemic blind spots could affect mathematical reasoning, in light of the Lucas-Penrose argument about human transcendence of mechanism. But it will come as a surprise.

The Argument from Looks: A Plea for Representational Humility

Wed 9th Apr, 1:30-3:00

Keith Wilson: The Argument from Looks: A Plea for Representational Humility

The assumption that perceptual experience (seeing, hearing, and so on) is fundamentally representational is common in much recent philosophy and cognitive science. It is an assumption, however, that is rarely argued for or examined in detail. According to this assumption, perceptual experience (as distinct from judgement or belief) represents the world as being, or as seeming to be, some particular way. That is, each experience has a determinate set of truth conditions. In this paper, I present an argument, inspired by Travis (2004), that aims to challenge this orthodoxy, instead claiming that there is no single representational content of experience. Consequently, whilst the argument does not entirely rule out the existence of perceptual representations, it does highlight a fundamental tension in the way philosophers and scientists of perception have thought about such representation that severely constrains its explanatory role, raising a number of questions that have yet to be satisfactorily answered by proponents of the representational view.