This morning, Tad Zawidzki drew my attention to the publication on Tuesday of this paper: Multisensory Integration in Complete Unawareness. What Faivre et al report there is exactly the kind of phenomenon that Ryan Scott, Jason Samaha, Zoltan Dienes and I have been investigating. In fact, we have been aware of Faivre et al’s study and cite it in our paper (that is currently under review).
Their work is good, but ours goes further. Specifically, we show that:
- a) Cross-modal associations can be learned when neither of the stimuli in the two modalities are consciously perceived (whereas the Faivre et al study relies on previously learned associations between consciously perceived stimuli).
- b) Such learning can occur with non-linguistic stimuli.
Together, a) and b) really strengthen the case against accounts that assert that consciousness is required for multi-sensory integration (e.g., Global Workspace Theory). Some defenders of such theories might try to brush aside results like that of Faivre et al by revising their theories to say that consciousness is only required for higher-level cognition, such as learning; and/or by setting aside linguistic stimuli as a special case of (consciously) pre-learned cross-modal associations which can be exploited by unconscious processes to achieve the appearance of multi-sensory integration. Our results block both of these attempts to save (what we refer to as) integration theories.
The principle of embodiment in cognitive science emphasises that the main object of cognition is to reason about systems which the agent itself is part of and can affect through its actions. I propose that particular real-world circumstances can undermine the assumption that the process of reasoning does not affect the systems being reasoned about, and explore why this is a problem for typical conceptions of rationality. We will also discuss how Sorensen’s concept of epistemic blind spots could affect mathematical reasoning, in light of the Lucas-Penrose argument about human transcendence of mechanism. But it will come as a surprise.
Working on thesis.
Working on Joint Session talk. Thought my subject – panpsychism and the composition problem – would be a welcome change from natural kinds and downward causation, but it turns out that deproblematising composition and adding the idea of the mind being composed of multiple virtual machines is a good way of arguing for non-reductive, downwardly causal mental properties.
Working on talk for E-int and Joint Session.
Went to 1st person approach conference in Berkeley – changed plan and gave a response to Susan Stewart’s criticism of synthetic phenomenology work.
Gave talk last week to philosophy faculty research progress meeting.
Going to Sweden on Monday till August.
Supervising MSc student – implementing web browsing advisor built on architecture inspired by Bernard Baars global workspace theory.
Preparing for presentation & working on thesis.
1 – The philosophy of mind reading group (see http://www.ifl.pt/index.php?id1=3&id2=8) had a meeting on a draft chapter of my book: Cognitive Technologies in Everyday Life: Tools for Thinking and Feeling. It generated some interesting discussion and it was very nice for me after all the time I’ve put into this.
2 – I’ve started organizing a research in progress group modelled on … you’ve guessed it E-I which will hopefully meet for the first time next week.
3 – Trying to finish a review for JCS of The Crucible of Consciousness by Zoltan Torey which is supposed to be in Friday.
Working on Joint Session talk.
- Wrote paper with Blay for “What Makes Us Moral?” conference in Amsterdam at month’s end and submitted it to the conference website. Presented the paper at a seminar here for last-minute feedback before submission.
- Re-wrote Chapter 5 of my thesis “The Limits of Concepts and Conceptual Abilities” into a standalone paper for a course I’m attending of the SweCog National Research School in Cognitive Science. Planning to submit it somewhere by month’s end.
- Doctoral thesis went lost in the (registered) post. So far neither Sweden nor the UK want to claim responsibility. Annoying as this may complicate my pay-grade change to postdoc status (seriously). Did I mention that the first time the bookbinders bound my thesis, they got my name wrong? :-P
Apologies for the delay.
- Collected my bound thesis from the bookbinders on Monday and posted it to Sussex: pretty much the last thing I have to do before I officially have earned my degree!
- Finished a first re-write of the paper I presented at Toward a Science of Consciousness – Stockholm, hoping to submit in the next few weeks (on the limits of concepts and conceptual abilities).
- Engaging in some email discussions with Blay and a philosopher here in Lund about compatibilism.
- Assisting Göran Sonesson with comments on a paper he is submitting, on the ability of chimpanzees to interpret different semiotic resources.
- Making painfully slow progress on the paper I need to write (so I can present!) at the What Makes Us Moral? conference in Amsterdam later this month.
- Trying to write a paper on Kirsh & Maglio’s epistemic action/pragmatic action distinction.
- Also Bob Chad sent his apologies for non-attendance today.
- Didn’t get the job in Norway.
- Finished my thesis corrections and sent them (unofficially) to the examiners. Still waiting on the formal notification from the university of the examiners’ recommendation / official list of and timetable for corrections, which I gather is now in the post.
- Invited for talk in Skövde for a psychology course on cognitive neuroscience (not exactly my area, I admit).
- Need to prepare talks for Toward a Science of Consciousness – Stockholm and the Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies, both at the start of May.
- Abstract accepted for poster at ASSC/Kyoto, but the expense doesn’t justify attending. Likewise I had a paper accepted for a short presentation at the Scandanavian Association for AI but ran out of time to re-format it to their needs, so again won’t be attending.
- Last week I attended a course on concepts hosted by SweCog (the National Research School in Cognitive Science). It was interesting, to say the least, to see my thesis subject matter presented back to me in a very different format by people from very different backgrounds to my own.
- This week I am proofreading like mad: in particular, Paulina Lindström’s doctoral thesis investigating mathematical problem solving and the precise moment when subjects understand the problem.
- I have finally, I think!, seen the last of the back-and-forth questions about my extended mind paper, which will be appearing in Teorema in, I think, May.
- I need to get started on my half-dozen thesis corrections. They shouldn’t take long to crank out; I just haven’t had any time.
As always, there are various things I should be working on getting published, and I am behind on my reading. :-) Hope to be back for a visit sometime next term!